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Philosophy as Articulation
Austin and Deleuze on Conceptual
Analysis
Richard Eldridge and Tamsin Lorraine

I
Whether doing thought experiments from their armchairs, consulting
intuitions, or inve�tigating possible worlds, contemporary philosophers
often describe what they do as conceptual analysis. This seems reasonable
enough, since philosophy is often concerned with highly general cognitive
claims and since the use of experimental and archival data is not as central
as it is in the natural and social sciences. The distinctive contribution of the
philosopher beyond the special sciences seems to involve an effort to make
plausible or compelling a way of looking at things that can be expressed in
a highly general, conceptual claim: the essence of matter is extension; the
right thing to do is whatever will produce the most net good consequences;
preferences are transitive; art is embodied meaning, and so on. Claims like
these are debated among philosophers, tested by reference to cases (often
imaginary ones), and revised, refined, and tested for coherence with other
claims, both general conceptual ones and more obviously empirical ones. If
one wants a name for these activities, conceptual analysis seems about as
good a candidate as there could be.
But are we clear either about what concepts are, about how they come
about, or about what, exactly, the activity of analyzing them is? In 1903,
near the dawn of analytic philosophy, G.E. Moore first formulated a ver
sion of what has come to be known as the paradox of analysis.1 Consider
a putative result of conceptual analysis expressed in a claim of the form
"Concept-word or phrase F is (essentially, necessarily) concept-word or
phrase G." [□(x) (Fx = Gx)]. Any object correctly characterized by concept
word or phrase Fis (essentially, necessarily) an object correctly characterized
by concept-word or phrase G. Alternatively, F and G are not synonymous;
in this latter case, the conceptual claim that all Fs are Gs seems, at best,
accidentally true or true as things happen to be, not necessarily true. As a
claim about necessary relations among concepts (or about relations between
essences) it seems false. Hence it seems difficult to formulate the results of
conceptual analysis in a way that is both informative and true.
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One way to block this result is to appeal to Frege's distinction between
sense and reference.2 Consider the expressions "the sum -of 19 and 8" and
"the cube of 3." These two expressions mean different things or have dif
ferent sense. 3 (A child who had learned to add but not to multiply might
fully understand the first but fail to understand the second.) Yet they have
the same referent-the number 27-and necessarily so. Perhaps, then, the
philosophical analysis of concepts might be comparable to the activity of
mathematical proof in yielding results (necessary truths about concepts)
involving same referent, different sense. By carefully inspecting, as it were,
the senses of two different concept words (an activity analogous to math
ematical proof in its abstraction from particular data), the philosopher as
analyst of concepts might arrive at results that are all at once true, informa
tive, and necessary.
Yet while this is an attractive suggestion, it also faces considerable dif
ficulties. First, in mathematics there are clear, shared standards for count
ing a sequence of mathematical statements as a proof. Mathematicians
know how to check for failures of valid argumentation, involving uncon
sidered possibilities and the like. It is not clear that there are similar clear,
shared standards for successful conceptual analysis. Second, as Frege
frankly holds, thinking of mathematical truth as he does involves a com
mitment to senses (and numbers) as Platonic entities, standing eternally
in relations to one another independently of human practice. This may
seem, on the face of it, plausible enough for numbers and shapes, say.
Hasn't it always been true that 3 plus 8 = 11? But one may also wonder:
were there (always already) those relations among numbers as abstract
objects, over and above the fact that a certain pile of eleven acorns is
exactly eight acorns bigger than a pile with only three, and so on for
similar cases? 4 We adopt "3 + 8 = 11" as a convenient norm of represen
tation that applies to a very wide range of objective facts. But is there a
matter of eternal mathematical fact over and above the many empirical
facts (and norms of adding) that are thus representable? Third, even if we
accept a Platonist construal of mathematical objects, it seems yet more
strained to suppose that, say, in the Precambrian Era, four billion years
ago before there was any life on earth, the sense (of the concept-word)
squirrel was already necessarily both contained in that of mammal and
waiting around to refer to the furry nut-gatherers who haunt our temper
ate parks and gardens. And then it seems yet more strained to hold that
something like this is true of the interesting concepts that stand in___need
of philosophical analysis precisely insofar as they are essentially related
to various human practices: justice, courage, art, decency, belief, and
so on. 5
These difficulties-lack of standards comparable to those in mathematics
for determining necessary truths, alternatives to mathematical Platonism,
and complex, non-natural kind concepts as the natural foci of philosophi
cal analysis-likewise trouble more empiricist approaches to the analysis of
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con cepts as essentially psychological entities in the mind or brain. While this
latter approach is free of worries about the nature and existence of abstract
objects, it also faces difficulties in construing full-blooded necessity with
respect to interesting concepts, as well as worries about how to identify con
cepts 'in' either the mind or brain, as entities that underlie and determine the
correct uses of concept-words. How could standards of correctness of use
and necessary relations of implication be established by merely empirically
6
existing entities with roles governed, at best, by empirical laws?
Perhaps, then, rather than thinking of concepts as some sorts of fixed
entities (Platonistic or psychological) whose natures and relations are open
to some kind of 'inspection,' it would be apt and useful to consider concepts
as essentially the meanings of concept-words as those words have complex,
sometimes changing, and sometimes contested uses in practice. This would
amount to thinking of the nature of concepts as determined by practice
(which might well have its own forms of reasonableness, groundings, and
responsiveness to reality in some cases), rather than vice versa, and think
ing of concepts in this way would yield a significantly different picture of
conceptual analysis as itself essentially practice-directed. What might con
ceptual analysis then look like?
II
In this view of conceptual analysis, the increasingly blurry line between ana
lyzing words as they have been used in practice and articulating new uses
of those words in the midst of living suggests that a notion of conceptual
articulation may be more appropriate. Plausibly, philosophers sensitive to
the difficulties we have just surveyed do not simply analyze how words are
used; they also put those words into use in ways they hope will affect our
perspectives and further thinking.
In fact, the idea that conceptual analysis is essentially practice-directed,
verging upon a practice of conceptual articulation and even conceptual cre
ation, was significantly developed in the middle third of the twentieth cen
tury, primarily by Austin, Wittgenstein, and Ryle, before the developments
of Quinean naturalism, Chomskyan psychologism, and Kripkean essential
ism, and then again by Deleuze in the latter part of the twentieth century.
Within the Anglo-American tradition, however, the relevant understandings
of conceptual analysis as essentially practice-directed, together with the rea
sons for them and the sorts of results such a practice might yield, have been
largely forgotten or ignored, largely under the pressures of naturalism, psy
chologism, and essentialism. Likewise, under the pressures of historicism, it
is often not recognized within the Continental European tradition that the
notion of philosophy as an activity of conceptual creation put forward by
Deleuze is in some ways akin to conceptual analysis in the styles of Austin
and Wittgenstein. Hence, comparing and elaborating different developments
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of conceptual analysis as essentially practice-directed not only can uncover
surprising affinities and points of significant internal debate within other
wise suppressed traditions, but also can potentially reinvigorate conceptual
analysis itself and bring two otherwise distinct lines of development into
more intimate and productive relation to one another.

m
Among developers of conceptual analysis within the Anglo-American tradi
tion, Austin has been particularly ignored, neglected not only in the wake
of the developments of essentialism and psychologism, but also in virtue
of falling under the shadow of Wittgenstein. Yet Austin's arguments, while
in some respects parallel to Wittgenstein's, are frequently compact, anti
gnomic, and forward-looking toward results in ways that Wittgenstein's
are not.
Austin's earliest published essay, his 1939 "Are There A Priori Con
cepts?" inaugurates both his attacks on concepts-as-entities and his
practice-oriented understandings of concepts and conceptual analysis.
Pointedly, Austin criticizes "the nonsense into which we are led through
the facile use of the word 'concept,' " in particular the nonsense of treat
ing a concept "as an article of property, a pretty straightforward piece of
goods, which comes into my 'possession,' if at all in some definite enough
manner and at some definite enough moment,'' so that "whether I do pos
sess it or not is, apparently, ascertained simply by making an inventory of
the 'furniture' of my mind."7 The reasons why this is nonsense are, first,
that we possess no direct intellectual, intuitive, or introspective access to
concepts as entities (Platonic or psychological). The only thing that can
show whether anyone 'possesses' a concept is whether that person consis
tently and reliably uses a concept-word within a roughly identifiable and
bounded practice of words-in-uses. Or as Austin puts it, "It seems clear,
then, that to ask 'whether we possess a certain concept' is the same as to ask
whether a certain word-or rather, sentences in which it occurs-has any
meaning," which question is, Austin adds, "likely to be ambiguous" and
at least in some cases not to admit of a simple and straightforward yes/no
answer.8 Second, the sentences in question, the uses of which may establish
mastery of a concept word and thus possession of a concept, are themselves
sentences that are available and intelligible within an ordinary, roughly and
indefinitely bounded common linguistic practice. "'Does he, or do they,
understand this word?' . . . means, speaking roughly, ['does he, or do they]
use [it] as we, or as most Englishmen, or as some other assignable persons
use [it?].' "9 Hence, trafficking in concepts, in the only sense we can give to
this notion, involves participating in a roughly and indefinitely bounded
practical life with other language users.
When we turn our attentions to actual uses of words, then what we
find is a range of phenomena that do not fall neatly under the model of
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concept-as-entity together with an extension. First, there is the conceptual
priority of sentence meaning over word meaning, in the sense that one must
accomplish a range of entire linguistic acts-calling attention to, exclaim
ing, asserting, laughing at, wondering whether, and so on-before one is
properly creditable with mastery of concept-words.10 Second, the fact that
all sentences are in some rough sense "about things" (in the broadest and
rnost indeterminate possible sense of "thing") does not imply that every
individual word denotes a thing. 11 Prepositions, adverbs, logical connec
tives, and so on are best conceived of not as names at all (and so not names
of functions), but rather as words that have systematic roles in contribut
ing to the meanings of the complete sentences in which they occur. Even
for words that are plausibly conceived of as (general) names-that is, for
one-place predicate expressions-it is a mistake to suppose that there is
for each one a single referent or extension, sharply bounded in the same
way from case to case. There is, Austin observes, "no reason whatever to
accept" the principl_e "unum nomen unum nominatum . . . . Why, if 'one
identical' word is used, must there b� 'one identical object' which it denotes?
Why should it not be the whole function of a word to denote many things?
[Footnote: Many similar things, on a plausible view: but other views might
be held]." 12
In fact, Austin goes on, in "The Meaning of a Word" (1940), to analyze
seven different varieties of "obvious cases where the reasons for 'calling dif
ferent sorts of things by the same name' are not to be dismissed lightly as
'similarity.' " 1 3 These seven varieties of cases of uses, in which correct appli
cations of concept words are not bounded by any single, obvious, simple,
and univocal rule, are: 14
1. paronymous uses: e.g., "healthy body" (a "nuclear sense") vs. "healthy
food" (productive of a healthy body) vs. "healthy glow" (resulting
from a healthy body); the body, food, and glow are not in any single,
obvious way alike.
2. analogous uses: e.g., "foot of a mountain,'' "foot of a page."
3. nontransitive uses: e.g., Bach's St. Matthew Passion and Mozart's
Requiem are both profound, and so are Mozart's Requiem and
Beethoven's Sonata #8 ("Pathetique"), but the Bach and the Beethoven
are not in any obvious way like one another.
4. uses of terms with multiple, independent criteria: e.g., "fascism,''
"cynicism."
5. determinates of determinables: e.g., "ultramarine blue" and "indigo
blue" are both blue, but otherwise quite different; more radically,
"pleasure in solving quadratic equations" and "pleasure in drinking
Belgian beer" are both pleasures but otherwise unlike.
6. quality/object ambiguities: "love" ("A's love for B,'' "my love"),
"youth" ("early in a developmental history" vs. "the youths").
7. activity-related terms: "cricket bat," "cricket umpire,'' "cricket pitch"
(two senses), "cricket sweater."
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Given such varieties of uses of single terms, where no clear, single rule for
application is evident, it is reasonable to conclude, as Austin does, that "An
actual language has few, if any explicit conventions, no sharp limits to the
spheres of operations of rules, no rigid separation of what is syntactical and
what semantical. " 15 About any particular use of any particular word in a
particular circumstance, it is possible to ask reasonably for clarification. Or,
as Austin puts it, we may ask, "What-is-the-meaning-of (the word) 'rat'?"
either in this case (rodent vs. informer) or with a specific, more general
range of cases or field of comparisons in view. But it is nonsense to ask,
"What is the-meaning-of-the-word-'rat'?" as though the expression con
taining dashes were the name of a fixed, univocal, and normatively disposi
tive substantive lying somehow behind our motley of uses. 16
The consequences of this view about the multiplicity and context- and
comparison- sensitivity of criteria for the correct usage of many terms are
immediate and powerful. Conceptual analysis cannot be any sort of inspec
tion (intellectual, intuitive, etc.) of a fixed 'meaning-body' behind or beyond
usage. We should instead pay attention to the complex criteria and com
mitments by which our usages are normatively governed, in multiple ways,
within our courses of practical responsiveness to the objects and phenomena
of our world. Clarification of cloudy or uncertain uses of concept-words is
likely to be piecemeal and field-of-comparison specific. "If we rush up for a
demand with a definition in the simple manner of Plato or many other phi
losophers, if we use the rigid dichotomy 'same meaning, different meaning,'
or 'What x means,' as distinguished from 'the things which are x,' we shall
simply make hashes of things." 17
Despite, however, his arguments and warnings against a certain pic
ture of conceptual analysis, Austin nonetheless himself clearly practices a
form of it. He devotes himself to "examining what we should say when,'' 18
including both actual and "imagined cases,'' 19 with the aim, for example,
of undoing significant confusions about freedom and responsibility. 20 At the
same time, in practicing his form of conceptual analysis, Austin concedes
that sometimes "people's usages do vary, and we do talk loosely, and we
do say different things apparently indifferently," 21 and that "it cannot be
expected that all examples will appeal equally to all hearers. " 22 Moreover,
ordinary usage, even when it is relatively clear and shared, is not sacrosanct.
"It equally will not do, having discovered the facts about 'ordinary usage'
to rest content with that, as though there were nothing more to be discussed
and discovered. There may be plenty which might happen and does happen
which would need new and better language to describe it." 23 Yet Austin
is practicing a form of conceptual analysis, not doing empirical linguistics
in the sense of simply tabulating (sometimes loose, sometimes divergent)
usages. What exactly then is Austin doing, when he is displaying cases in
which we would clearly call one thing an accident and another a mistake,
one thing a case of succumbing to temptation and another quite different
thing a case of losing control of oneself?24
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This is not an easy question to answer. But one helpful suggestion, made
by Stanley Bates and Ted Cohen, following up on work by Stanley Cavell, is
that Austin, along with anyone who enters a claim about what we say when,
•s speaking "with a universal voice," in Kant's sense of this phrase in The
25
�ritique of the Power of Judgment. According to Kant, when someone
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mean
ment that something is beautiful expresses a sense of having experienced
50mething in a certain way, as a certain kind of achievement of distinctively
pleasurable intelligibility, coupled with a sense that it must be so experi
enced, that others must experience it likewise (if they pay attention to it in
the right way).
Adapted, then, to the judgment of the ordinary language philosopher
about what we say when, the thought is that making such a claim is
bo th enabling others to hear and say likewise and demanding that they
do so.28 Such a claim can always fail, just as a critic's claims directed at
the enabling of aesthetic experience can fail or be repudiated. (Perhaps
the critic has paid attention in the wrong way, or perhaps the work is
simply inaccessible to some others.) But such failures do not impugn the
reasonableness of the procedure, which sometimes leads to success in the
form, in the case of claims about what we say when, of felt satisfaction
and rightness in what one, along with others, clearly and confidently says
and means.
This picture of the possible achievement arrived at via claims about what
we say when thus implies that, prior to such achievements, one, along with
others, may have been judging and speaking in a kind of incoherence, in
a fugue state of half-meaning or not fully meaning what one had said or
thought, as though one were a living victim of cliche and inattentiveness.
Hence the claim of the ordinary language philosopher as analyzer of con
cepts is directed at furthering a kind of awakening to one's own judgments,
thoughts, and experiences, directed toward a kind of heightened, more flu
ent and apt responsiveness to the things of one's world. Both awakening
and heightened fluency and responsiveness can be shared with others with
whom one shares a language and world, and, in following the ordinary
language philosopher's claim with their own ears and minds, its hearers or
readers may arrive at such shared fluency and responsiveness for themselves.
Or, of course, they may not. But what is at stake in the ordinary language
philosopher's entering of a claim about what we say when is the achieve
ment of a kind of heightened life as a responsive subject in relation to things,
under conditions in which, always, that life is liable to become sterile and
unthinking. Since such threats are permanent, philosophy is centrally less a
body of theory than it is centrally an ongoing critical activity in the service
of life.
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IV
In A T housand Plateaus, Deleuze, with Guattari, approvingly states with
respect to Austin's pragmatic approach to language that "the meaning and
syntax of language can no longer be defined independently of the speech
acts they presuppose. "29 Deleuze and Guattari's theory of language will ulti
mately challenge traditional notions of the speaking subject by considering
speech acts as effects of what they call "collective assemblages of enun
ciation"-ways of meaning-making with implicit rules that change over
time-rather than of the particular subjects making the speech acts.3° Fur
thermore, they characterize philosophy as a practice that, along with creat
ing concepts, creates what they call "conceptual personae" in defiance of the
personal identities of embodied philosophers.31 Nevertheless, they, like Aus
tin, consider philosophy to be a critical activity that can help us to achieve
a heightened response to life.32
According to Deleuze, thinking is part of life; a philosophy that would
freeze thinking into propositions that it proclaims to be timelessly true is
a philosophy that becomes increasingly out of step with the need to make
sense of the life in which we are immersed. Just as life cannot be reduced
to the forms we perceive at a given moment, so the wisdom philosophy
seeks cannot be reduced to propositions that fixate moments of thinking.
Life is always more than what is manifest to our conscious awareness-it
is also the intensities that are moving what is manifest into new forms, the
imperceptible forces insisting in the most fleeting moment that are even now
moving whatever is toward something else.
To counter the notion of a philosophical concept as a word or term with
a fixed meaning that can be cashed out in a set of propositions, Deleuze pos
its it as an event. 33 Like any word, a concept may be attributable to specific
states of affairs, but the sense of the concept is always in excess of any given
state of affairs; not only are there always other states of affairs to which
it may also apply, but the meanings of the concept will reverberate differ
ently in keeping with shifts in the internal relations of its components and
its relations to other concepts. Deleuze characterizes concepts in a way that
not only attempts to shake us out of the ruts of conventional movements of
thought, but also conceives them as integrally related to and yet in excess of
the empirical movements of thinking that actualize them.
Deleuze's conception of the time-image that appears in modern cinema
presents some aspects of what he thinks philosophical thinking can do.
While the perspective of the camera can be taken up by the spectator as a
gaze with which the spectator can identify, cinema is also capable of going
beyond any one gaze and, by virtue of deliberately playing with the "irra
tional cuts" made possible by film, evoking a multiplicity of perspectives
that cannot be assimilated into one rational whole. Cinema is an art form
that can access what Deleuze calls the virtual-what we might here describe
as the transcendental field of virtual relations conditioning what actually
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appears-by going beyond any one perspective in order to intimate a whole
of multiple perspectives that can no longer be contained within one totaliz
able whole.34
While the cinematic time-image intimates the intensities that haunt the
e
sp cific moment in space and time rendered by the cinematic shot, phi
lo sophy deliberately confronts the transcendental field of infinite meaning.
A philosopher creates a novel perspective from a plane of immanence-a
pre-philosophical plane constituting a problem to which thought responds
by breaking out of the constraints of common sense perception and opin
3
ion. 5 This perspective travels from the specific lived experiences of the phi
losopher back up to a realm of meaning unfettered by the common and by
the good sense of a philosopher and her personal identity. The philosopher's
concept, by virtue of its access to a stratigraphic time in which all words are
connected to all other words, taps resonances, echoes, and intensities that
can incite novel trajectories of meaning out of the transcendental field of
sense that conditions specific acts of meaning.
Working with sense-paying attention to the components of meaning
that make up a particular concept, playing with those components until the
concept attains a kind of fullness-a self-referential quality that stabilizes it
out of a sea of possible meanings-allows one to move away from a par
ticular state of affairs in order to make generalizations that apply to more
than that one state of affairs without losing touch with the actual situation
out of which it emerged. A philosophical concept attempts to get at mean
ings that can be applied to more than one situation, meanings haunted by
implicit trajectories that could unfold in more than one way. It is thus an
event rather than a representation of a state of affairs, a constellation of
meanings that actualize some rather than others of the virtual relations of a
transcendental field of sense. It entails tendencies toward further movements
of thought that may or may not actually unfold, and it is a configuration of
meaning that can be ascribed to multiple states of affairs.
A philosopher in doing philosophy breaks from her personal identity and
creates perspectives on a plane of immanence drawn from her pragmatic
situation-the situation she lives as an embodied individual immersed in the
life of a specific social field. The meaning of words plays out against a tran
scendental field of sense where the meaning of particular sentences stabilizes
in the context of the referents and speakers of pragmatic situations. That
meaning, however, could always have played out otherwise with different
inflections, thus actualizing other nuances in connection with the discursive
and non-discursive practices informing the social field from which those
meanings emerge. A plane of immanence emerges with the creation of con
cepts that condense components of thought and link up to other concepts.
The self-referential connections that form within and between concepts con
stitute new forms of meaning that allow one to leave behind the constraints
of a conventional perspective on life and yet to stabilize meaning out of the
chaotic possibilities of sense.
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If language can never completely capture truth in relation to life it is
because truth unfolds in time. And time entails the continual unfolding
of the new, as well as the repetition of patterns familiar to us due to our
experience with the past. If we consider the truth of this moment here and
now-this moment of life that I am living-we know that we can never do
it justice. Any articulation of this moment must fail because this moment is
always unfolding into the next and, even if we can detect patterns that we
can recognize as equally true of the past as of the present, those patterns can
never capture the truth of this moment.
According to Henri Bergson, who is an important influence in Deleuze's
work, in order for conscious perception to be that of a living organism able
to act in ways that will ensure its survival, it must suppress the greater part
of the complicated enmeshment of material life in order to discern what is
of practical interest from the perspective of a particular organism with par
ticular needs. In Matter and Memory, Bergson considers the relationship of
material objects to our perceptions of them; he conceives a material object
apart from our perception of that object as an image among a universe of
images, all of which are material points without perspective that implicate
and impact one another. He contrasts "the image which I call a material
object" to the represented image that is a conscious perception of that mate
rial object: "That which distinguishes it as a present image, as an objective
reality, from a represented image is the necessity which obliges it to act
through every one of its points upon all the points of all other images, to
transmit the whole of what it receives, to oppose to every action an equal
and contrary reaction, to be, in short, merely a road by which pass, in every
direction, the modifications propagated throughout the immensity of the
universe. " 36 As Alia Al-Saji puts it, such "an unperceived and unperceiving
point virtually implies the rest of the dynamic and interpenetrating universe
in its complexity and richness, with its infinite and incompossible relations.
Its vision is a non-selective and indifferent kind, which registers everything
but discerns nothing. " 37 A conscious perspective requires "a process that
limits and diminishes the virtual whole. It is in this way that representation
and consciousness come about. " 38
The futility of attempting to capture life with a static image is appar
ent when one stares at a photograph of a loved one who has passed away.
Words likewise inevitably fail to capture the living presence of one who is
no longer with us. What "truth" about a loved one refuses distillation into a
form we can grasp even when she or he is gone? It is toward art that we may
look to capture something of the truth of concrete forms of life. Deleuze's
books on Francis Bacon, Marcel Proust, and cinema develop an intriguing
understanding of this kind of aesthetic truth that is an illuminating coun
terpart to Deleuze's conception of philosophy as a thought form that entails
creating concepts.
If we consider Bergson's comparison of a material image to the repre
sented image of conscious perception, we can see that anything that we can

Philosophy as Articulation 69
call a perspective is in a sense haunted by interpenetrating influences that
always exceed those that emerge in relation to the needs of a particular
organism. The force of these influences constitutes a kind of ontological
unconscious that is the virtual reality inflecting any actualized present.
In his book on the painter Francis Bacon, Francis Bacon: The Logic of
Sensation, Deleuze distinguishes between sensation and perception; sensa
tion refers to a kind of experience that is imperceptible, since it refers to
forces impinging on unreflective awareness (and also entailing our own
impingement on what's around us) that affect how we experience the world
but that lie just beyond the edges of what we can pin down in perceptions
stable enough to describe. 39 According to Deleuze, art composes monu
ments of sensation that intimate a visceral becoming-other that haunts our
conscious awareness without becoming overtly manifest. 40
In The Logic of Sensation, Deleuze describes how Bacon talks about cap
turing a likeness in a portrait that goes beyond appearance and evokes the
intensity of the real; .instead of doing portraits that rest with the form of a
particular human being as she is pre:,ent in appearance at a given point in
time, Bacon hints at the forces making up that human being-forces that
are always in the process of unfolding. 41 Thus, Bacon moves beyond the
conventions of perception and through his paintings evokes sensation-an
experience of visceral affect inarticulable in words and eluding familiar
forms of perception and instead evoking a sense of discomfort and unfamil
iarity that allows us to experience something about those human beings and
the human condition that we had not before.
By opening up an aesthetic articulation of the world of the novel through
an exploration into the depth of events, Proust similarly investigates the
virtual past of those events in a way that shows us the intensity of time. 42
His series of novels evokes life in terms of a memory that exceeds any one
perspective or a multiplicity of perspectives that can be correlated into one
homogeneous whole and instead posits what Deleuze calls "fragments" that
cannot be put together and instead are put alongside one another.43 These
fragments evoke a past that may not have become explicit to consciousness,
but that insists itself in the present in terms of what would have to change in
the present, actualized situation in order for it to move over thresholds into
a different situation. These fragments cannot be assimilated into one whole
because they compose different fragments of duration that could unfold in
ways that are incompatible with other durations. Because how each frag
ment unfolds with respect to other fragments exerts its own effects, there
is no way to organize them into a linear chain of cause and effect. Instead,
each fragment could set off a whole series of unfoldings, each of which
would interact with other series in unpredictable ways. To stay with the
appearance of what has already actually unfolded is thus for Deleuze to
overlook a crucial aspect of the real.
Philosophy, unlike art, does not look at the becoming of specific things-of
a specific human body or the portrait of an individual. But according to
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because they compose different fragments of duration that could unfold in
ways that are incompatible with other durations. Because how each frag
ment unfolds with respect to other fragments exerts its own effects, there
is no way to organize them into a linear chain of cause and effect. Instead,
each fragment could set off a whole series of unfoldings, each of which
would interact with other series in unpredictable ways. To stay with the
appearance of what has already actually unfolded is thus for Deleuze to
overlook a crucial aspect of the real.
Philosophy, unlike art, does not look at the becoming of specific things-of
a specific human body or the portrait of an individual. But according to
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Deleuze, it, like art, provides access to a chaotic world that defies contain
ment of the world within categories that we have applied to past events.
Philosophy-like art and science-is a distinctive form of thought that
creatively grapples with life's novelty. While art composes monuments of
sensation-percepts (perceptions that evoke becoming-other) and affects
(emotions that evoke becoming-other)-and science invents functions on a
plane of reference, philosophy creates concepts.44
It is a paradox that, even when philosophy is conceived as a set of time
less truths waiting to be discovered, it is never satisfied with its answers;
philosophy is an open-ended process in which one must inevitably question
the truths one has arrived at and continue the process of thinking. Deleuze's
conception of philosophy as a thought form that creates concepts entails the
notion of a concept as an event rather than a fixed truth. A concept as an
event of thought is a virtual multiplicity whose internal links among com
ponents of meaning and external links to other concepts make up a plane
of immanence that evokes the restless movement of thinking as a generative
process. Our contemporary situation-one of rapid change and unprece
dented problems of almost unthinkable scale-is perhaps one that demands
this Deleuzian conception. Only a philosophy that includes a temporal as
well as spatial dimension can speak to a thinking that arises from and keeps
pace with the accelerating speed of life's movement.

V
Austin, by articulating a notion of concepts as practice-directed, turns our
attention from concepts as reified entities to which our conceptual activ
ity refers (more or less well) to embodied practices in and through which
concepts evolve. Philosophical activity as conceptual analysis becomes a
practice-directed by immanent rules in which we attempt to become ever
more aware and more precise about how we articulate meanings we share.
Such activity demands attention to those rules in the living contexts in which
they are applied, rather than accepting past applications as automatically
transferable to present circumstances.
Austin's particular style and point in cultivating this active attention are a
function of his sense that we are sometimes captivated by impossible images
of absolute control in thinking and judging that are associated with meta
physical philosophy. We often enough fail to think clearly and have instead
rushed into a theoretical stance that counterfeits our interests by running
against the grain of ordinary life that is often meaningful enough. As Austin
puts it in "A Plea for Excuses," "ordinary language is not the last word: in
principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and super
seded. Only remember, it is the first word," in virtue of embodying "the
inherited experience and acumen of many generations. " 45
Deleuze, with his characterization of concepts as events, indicates some
thing of the past of meaning-making as it informs its present evolution.
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ing new possibilities of practice against the gram of a common life that 1s
all too likely to be ossified or constrained by implicit rules that refuse life's
experimentation with the new.
For both Austin and Deleuze, however, philosophical activity is a form of
practice in the articulation of concepts that can bre_ak �ith ritualized ways
of thinking by attending to the virtual echoes that mev1tably emerge as we
articulate our responses to life. If Austin enacts a contemporary sense that
human life is both chaotically fragmented and over-intellectualized, Deleuze
enacts a contemporary sense of being frozen in one-sidedness and subject
to the sedimented patterns of the already said and done. Both senses strike
us as reasonable perceptions of threats posed to human flourishing in cur
rent circumstances. Given the nature and difficulty of these partly opposed,
partly complementary threats, it is clear why, in the view of both Austin and
Deleuze, the practice of philosophy as conceptual articulation not only is
inevitably open-ended, but also plays a crucial role in the ongoing attune
ments of humanity to life.

NOTES
1 See Moore (1903), p. 442. Moore's stalking horse example is the Idealist
analysis of the concept yellow that is expressed in the claim (Moore calls it a
formula) "yellow is the sensation of yellow."
2 Frege (1892). Following the opening discussion of the problem of cognitively
informative identity statements, the sense/reference distinction is introduced
on p. 200.
3 The sense of an expression is, roughly, its linguistic meaning plus any fur
ther information that is relevant and available in virtue of its context of use.
Since the context of mathematics is (usually) completely general, contextual
specificities can normally be discounted there and sense can be identified with
linguistic meaning.
4 Thoughts like this might suggest a structuralist conception of mathematics: a
common pattern is instanced in various groups of acorns, pebbles, kernels of
corn, etc., and mathematics might be about such patterns, rather than about
independently existing, eternal abstract objects.
5 Similar points haunt a Kripkean approach, in the spirit of Frege, to empirically
knowable necessary truths. When does empirical inquiry yield strong, more
than pragmatic necessity with regard to natural kinds? And what about the
important, complex non-natural kind-concepts that are the traditional con
cerns of philosophical analysis?
6 Frege's criticisms of psychologism are to the point here, even if his own Pla
tonist alternative is not free of problems of its own.
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with mastery of a concept-word as opposed to the 1ssmng of a happenstant1al
noise.
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10 See Austin (1939), p. 40 as well as Austin (1940), p.56.
11 Austin (1939), p. 40.
12 Austin (1939), p. 38.
13 Austin (1940), p. 71.
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14 The following seven points summarize Austin's discussion
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pp. 71-74.
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16 Austin (1940), p. 55.
17 Austin (1940), p. 74.
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19 Austin (1966), p. 274.
.
.
20 See the discussions of the importance of Aristotle in havmg recogmzed that
questions of who is responsible for what (and who may be excused for what)
_
are more natural than and prior to (artificial) 'theoretical' invest1gat1ons
of the
freedom of the will in Austin (1957), p. 180, and Austin (1966), p. 273.
21 Austin (1957), p. 183.
22 Austin (1940), p. 66.
23 Austin (1940), p. 69.Compare Austin (1957), p. 185.
24 These distinctions appear in Austin (1957), pp. 185n. and 198n. .
25 Bates and Cohen (1972), p. 22. Kant introduces the idea of speakmg with a
universal voice in §8 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment in order to cap
ture the unique kind of claim that is made in calling anything beautiful. Kant
(2000), V: 216, p. 101.
.
.
26 The postulate/demand and predict/ascribe distinctions are laid out m Kant
(2000), §§7, 8, V: 212-13, 216; pp. 98. 101.
27 Kant (2000), §56, V: 338, p. 214.
. .
28 Stanley Cavell develops the parnllel between the_judgments o� the cnuc of the
arts and the claims of the ordmary language philosopher m Aesthetic Prob
lems of Modern Philosophy," in Cavell (1969), pp. 88-96.
29 Deleuze and Guattari (1987), p.77.
30 "It is the illocutionary that constitutes the nondiscursive or implicit presupposi
tions. And the illocutionary is in turn explained by collective assemblages of
enunciation, by juridical acts or equivalents of juridical acts, which, !ar from de
pending on subjectification proceedings or assignations of subiects m language,
in fact determine their distribution," (Deleuze and Guattan (1987), p. 78).
31 "The face and body of philosophers shelter these personae who often give
them a strange appearance, especially in the glance, as if someone else was
looking through their eyes." Deleuze and Guattari (1994)� p. 73. For more on
conceptual personae see chapter 3 of Deleuze and Guattan (1994), pp. 61-83.
32 Since the following discussion is framed through Deleuze's work rather than
through that of Guattari, the references to A Thousand Plateaus and Deleuze
and Guattari's book, What is Philosophy? (Deleuze and Guattan 1994) will
henceforth be referred to as Deleuze.
33 "Concepts are events" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994), p. 36.Deleuze and Guat
tari also here characterize the concept as "speaking" or "knowing" the event
(pp. 21, 33) and philosophy as drawing concepts from states of affairs _"in
asmuch as it extracts the event from them" (p. 52). "The concept 1s neither
denotation of states of affairs nor signification of the lived; it is the event
as pure sense that immediately runs through its components" (p. 144). The
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concept of the event is developed by Deleuze, and Deleuze with Guattari, in
multiple places. For some relevant examples see Deleuze and Guattari (1994),
pp. 156-178 and Deleuze (1990), pp. 12-22, 52-57, and 148-153.
34 Deleuze develops the concept of the time-image with respect to Henri Bergson's
notions of the actual and the virtual in his book, Cinema 2: The Time-Image
(Deleuze 1989). See p. 74 and pp.105-11 for Deleuze's characterization of
the images related to the mystery of Kane's dying word, "Rosebud," in Orson
Welle's film Citizen Kane as an example of an early depiction of the direct
time-image in modern cinema.
35 See ch. 2, "The Plane of Immanence" in Deleuze and Guattari (1994),
pp. 35-60.
36 Bergson (1991), p. 34.
37 Al-Saji (2004), p.220.
38 Al-Saji (2004), p. 220.
39 See Bogue (2003), pp. 116-121, for more on Deleuze's distinction between
sensation and perception and its sources in the work of Henri Maldiney and
Erwin Straus.
40 "We attain to the percept and the affect only as to autonomous and sufficient
beings that no longer owe anything to those who experience or have experi
enced them: Combray [the town evoked by Proust's madeleine] like it never
was, is or will be lived; Combray · as cathedral or monument" (Deleuze and
Guattari 1994, p. 168).
41 "But in the end, it is a movement 'in-place,' a spasm, which reveals a com
pletely different problem characteristic of Bacon: the action of invisible forces
on the body" (Deleuze 2003), p. 36.
42 The connection made here between the concept of sensation that Deleuze de
velops in The Logic of Sensation and the concept of the fragment he develops
in Proust and Signs is indebted to Miguel de Beistegui's lucid commentary
in chapter 6 of his book, Immanence: Deleuze and Philosophy (de Beistegui
2010), pp. 160-191.
43 "Even when the past is given back to us in essences ... what is given us is
neither a totality nor an eternity, but 'a bit of time in the pure state', that is, a
fragment (Proust, A la Recherche du temps perdu, Bibliotheque de la Pleiade,
III, p. 705)" (Deleuze, 2000, p. 122). "By setting fragments into fragments,
Proust finds the means of making us contemplate them all, but without refer
ence to a unity from which they might derive or which itself would derive from
them" (Deleuze (2000), p. 123).
44 Deleuze and Guattari (1994), p. 197.
45 Austin (1957), p. 185.
46 "[T]he concept in philosophy expresses an event that gives consistency to the
virtual on a plane of immanence in an ordered form" Deleuze and Guattari
(1994), p. 133.
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Conceptual Genealogy for
Analytic Philosophy
Catarina Dutilh Novaes

1. INTRODUCTION
The significance attributed to the history of philosophy for the systematic
investigation of philosophical issues divides the analytic and the continen
tal philosophical traditions. Typically, the continental philosopher sees the
historical development of a given philosophical issue or concept as a sub
stantial and perhaps even indispensable element for the analysis, whereas
the analytic philosopher tends to treat issues and concepts as if they were
ahistorical entities, thus not requiring such a historical contextualization to
be properly grasped. 1
Influential 'continental' authors such as Nietzsche and Foucault have
placed historical analysis at the epicenter of their respective philosophical
methodologies, in particular with the concepts of 'genealogy' and 'archaeol
ogy.' More recently, 'analytic' authors such as Ian Hacking, Edward Craig,
and Bernard Williams, among others, have pursued similar lines of inves
tigation . For the most part, however, and despite some notable exceptions
(such as Crane 2015), analytic philosophers remain quite hostile to the idea
that the systematic analysis of a given concept or issue has something to
benefit from becoming historically informed.
In this paper, I discuss in detail a philosophical methodology that I call
'conceptual genealogy.' T his methodology underpins much of my work in
the history and philosophy of logic to date (for example, my work on the
concept of logical form), which however falls squarely within the 'analytic
tradition.'2 I argue that analytic philosophy in general has much to gain
from incorporating the historicist component of genealogical investigations.
Analytic philosophers too must take seriously the idea that philosophical
concepts may be historical products, rather than atemporal natural kinds or
essences, and that they bring along with them traces of their historical devel
opment as well as of broader cultural contexts. Indeed, one of the key aspects
of typical genealogical approaches (as is clear, in particular, in Nietzsche) is
an emphasis on the contingent nature of (philosophical) concepts and phe
nomena as products of long and winding historical developments. More
over, conceptual genealogy produces narratives whose protagonists are

